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REDEFINING THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
OF PUBLISHERS AND AUTHORS*
by Melvin Simensky**
I. INTRODUCTION
The language of the typical book publishing agreement reflects the
unequal power of the contracting parties-publisher and author. Gener-
ally, the publisher is granted an exclusive and immediate right to publish,
and wide discretion in the performance of its obligations. In return, the
author usually receives a refundable advance and little latitude, at least
on paper, in meeting his or her duties.' Two recent decisions, Dell Pub-
lishing Co. v. Whedon2 and Zilg v. Prentice-Hall, Inc.,' dramatically
restructure the author-publisher relationship through the liberalizing
construction of three of the most important contract clauses in every
book publishing agreement. These clauses concern the following: (1) de-
livery of a satisfactory manuscript; (2) the grant of an exclusive right to
publish; and (3) the duty to promote the publication.
The significance of Dell and Zilg is their finding that the covenant of
"good faith and fair dealing," implied in every publishing contract,4 im-
poses specific obligations on a publisher. In Dell, the court held that a
publisher's "good faith" rejection of a manuscript as unsatisfactory obli-
gated the publisher to provide the author with criticism of the manu-
script and an opportunity to revise it before rejection.5 Additionally,
* © Copyright 1985 Melvin Simensky.
* B.A. 1968, Yale University; J.D. 1972, New York University. Melvin Simensky, a
partner in the New York firm of Gersten, Savage, Kaplowitz & Simensky, is Adjunct Professor
of Law at New York University School of Law and co-author of the treatise, ENTERTAIN-
MENT LAW, published by Shepard's/McGraw-Hill. Mr. Simensky is also co-author of an
entertainment law casebook of the same name published by Matthew Bender.
The author wishes to express his grateful appreciation to Janet Linn, of the New York
Bar, for her invaluable assistance in the preparation of this Article.
1. See Shapiro, The Standard Author Contract A Survey of Current Draftsmanship, 18
COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 135, 167 (1970). In J.B. Lippincott Co. v. Lasher, 430 F.
Supp. 993, 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), Judge Duffy noted that publishers, through superior bargain-
ing power, "in fact, often enforce their will on unsuspecting artists."
2. 577 F. Supp. 1459 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
3. 717 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 1911 (1984).
4. Zilg v. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (motion for summary
judgment); Van Valkenburgh, Nooger & Neville, Inc. v. Hayden Publishing Co., 30 N.Y.2d
34, 45, 281 N.E.2d 142, 144, 330 N.Y.S.2d 329, 333, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 875 (1972).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 23-31.
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dictum in Dell suggests that the grant of an exclusive right to publish is
conditioned on publication and, until that time, is really no more than an
exclusive option to publish.6 In Zig, the Second Circuit held that a pub-
lisher's "good faith" obligation to publish and promote a manuscript fol-
lowing acceptance implies a specific standard to be met respecting the
work's first printing.7
The judicial construction given each of these three clauses alters the
present imbalance between author and publisher by placing greater bur-
dens upon a publisher. What this greater equalization between author
and publisher portends, however, is uncertain. After Dell and Zilg, a
publisher owes more concrete and specific, rather than undefined, obliga-
tions in certain key areas. Exactly how much specificity will be required,
and what discretion remains to a publisher, is less clear. Ironically, the
ultimate effect of these two decisions may be an unhappy one for pro-
spective authors, because publishers may enter into fewer agreements
with authors as a result of the greater obligations these agreements will
involve.
II. PRESENT PUBLISHING INDUSTRY PRACTICE
Every publishing agreement contains a clause requiring the author
to deliver a satisfactory manuscript to his or her publisher. According to
one commentator, the acceptability of a manuscript in the literary sense
"is, and probably should be, the most material factor in a publishing con-
tract."' The clause at issue in Dell is typical:
The Author shall deliver .. .the work to Dell in form,
style and content satisfactory to Dell . . . .If the Author fails
to so deliver, then the Author shall, at Dell's request, promptly
return to Dell any payments made to the Author pursuant to
this agreement.9
Dell's significance, lying in its interpretation of this clause, can only
be understood in the context of prevailing industry practice, which Dell,
if not reversed or modified on appeal, seems destined to change.
The typical book publishing agreement presently requires the author
to deliver a manuscript "in form, style and content satisfactory" to the
publisher, even though no definition of "satisfactory" is provided. Case
6. See infra text accompanying notes 32-33.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 54-68.
8. Healy & Alonso, Author's Rights: Waiver, Estoppel, and Good Faith in Book Publish-
ing Contracts, 15 NEw ENG. L. REV. 485, 494 (1980).
9. Dell Publishing Co. v. Whedon, 577 F. Supp. 1459, 1460 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (quoting
paragraph 2 of'the contract).
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law has defined "satisfaction" as being the publisher's "subjective and
personal satisfaction." The satisfaction of any other party, or reasonable
satisfaction, has been considered irrelevant, and review of a publisher's
decision rejecting a manuscript has, therefore, been regarded as almost
impossible. "
The typical book publishing agreement presently allows the pub-
lisher near total discretion in determining whether a manuscript is satis-
factory.l" Since no contractual limit is placed on the publisher's ability
to reject, some critics have charged that a typical book publishing agree-
ment permits a publisher to cancel the contract and recoup all advances
simply by claiming that a manuscript is unsatisfactory. 2
Under these circumstances, the publishing contract would be illu-
sory, i.e., void for lack of mutuality. To prevent this, courts have implied
an obligation on the part of publishers to act in good faith in rejecting a
manuscript.13 By this means, a publisher's inability to reject, except by
reason of an honest belief that a work is not satisfactory, constitutes the
requisite consideration to support the publishing agreement. 14
Most cases prior to Dell held that an author could only prove that a
publisher breached its implied obligations to act in good faith in rejecting
a manuscript if the author could show that the publisher's judgment was
not honestly held. 15 The author was required to present proof of the bad
faith reasons prompting the rejection. It is often impossible, however, for
10. Healy & Alonso, supra note 8, at 488-90. See Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. v. Montagu,
35 COPYRIGHT OFF. BULL. 562, 564 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1965) (since manuscript calls for exercise
of judgment and sensibility, only good faith in the exercise of dissatisfaction is required. In
matters of utility, marketability and fitness, reasonability is infused into the determination of
satisfaction); Safire v. William & Morrow Co., 136 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, BOOK PUB-
LISHING 22 (1981) (arbitration award) (since only publisher's satisfaction is addressed, no testi-
mony would be taken on literary worth, nor would manuscript be read).
But see A.A. Wyn, Inc. v. Saroyan, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 16, 1956, at 7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956)
(publisher's failure to accept editor's recommendation to publish was unreasonable).
11. See Walker v. Edward Thompson Co., 37 A.D. 536, 56 N.Y.S. 326 (1899) (publisher
has absolute right to reject).
12. Healy & Alonso, supra note 8, at 489-90.
13. Id. at 491. See, e.g., Random House, Inc. v. Gold, 464 F. Supp. 1306, 1308-09
(S.D.N.Y.), affid mem., 607 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1979) ("The requirement that a manuscript be
satisfactory to the publisher gives it the right to reject a work if it acts in good faith."); Holt,
Rinehart & Winston, Inc. v. Wolman, 47 A.D.2d 872, 368 N.Y.S.2d 813 (1975); Frederick A.
Praeger, Inc. v. Montagu, 35 COPYRIGHT OFF. BULL. 562 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1965).
14. Healy & Alonso, supra note 8, at 489-90.
15. See, e.g., Random House, Inc. v. Gold, 464 F. Supp. 1306 (S.D.N.Y.), affid meri, 607
F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1979); Haynes v. Ginn & Co., 136 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, BOOK
PUBLISHING 85 (1981) (N.D. Ill. 1973) (unpublished opinion), aff'd mem., 511 F.2d 1405 (7th
Cir. 1975) (judgment on acceptability of manuscript is for publisher and, since author admitted
publisher's criticism was made in good faith, publisher's motion for summary judgment would
be granted); Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. v. Montagu, 35 COPYRIGHT OFF. BULL. 562, 564
1985]
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an author to discover, much less to prove, bad faith absent explicit docu-
mentation in a publisher's files. Furthermore, what constitutes "good
faith" or "bad faith" is not always clear.
Two important decisions preceding Dell examined the parameters of
a publisher's implied obligation to act in good faith in rejecting a manu-
script as unsatisfactory. In the first, Random House, Inc. v. Gold,16 the
author claimed that the publisher's rejection of his work was not based
on the aesthetic worth of the work, which the publisher offered to publish
if the author renegotiated his contract, but on financial circumstances
and the work's likely commercial success. The court held that a rejection
based on such economic considerations constituted a rejection in good
faith. 17
The second decision, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc. v. Goldwa-
ter,"8 involved a contract for Senator Barry Goldwater's memoirs made
with Goldwater and a writer named Shadegg. During the time the au-
thors worked on the manuscript, their editor never provided editorial
comment, despite repeated requests, and she never directly communi-
cated to the authors her continuing dissatisfaction with the manuscript.
In fact, the editor, refusing to apprise the authors of her constant nega-
tive view of the manuscript, indicated support and enthusiasm. All
along, however, the publisher was looking for another writer for the
memoirs. On these facts, the court found that there was "an intention
[by the publisher] to refrain from doing editorial work with Shadegg," so
that another writer might be substituted.19
On the basis of this finding, and stating that the publisher had
"wilfully" failed to engage in any editorial work,20 the court held that the
publisher had breached its contract with Goldwater, thereby precluding
the return of its advance. In so holding, the court reasoned that there is
an implied obligation in a "contract of this kind for the publisher to en-
gage in appropriate editorial work," otherwise the author would be de-
nied a "reasonable opportunity to perform to the satisfaction of the
publisher."21 The court cited no authority as a basis for changing the
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1965) (judgment on manuscript requires merely the exercise of good faith in the
exercise of dissatisfaction).
Cf. A.A. Wyn, Inc. v. Saroyan, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 16, 1956, at 7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956).
16. 464 F. Supp. 1306 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 607 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1979).
17. 464 F. Supp. at 1308-09.
18. 532 F. Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
19. Id. at 623.
20. The court cursorily stated: "I conclude that [Harcourt Brace Jovanovich] breached its
contract with Shadegg and Goldwater by wilfully failing to engage in any rudimentary edito-
rial work or effort." Id. at 625.
21. Id. at 624.
[Vol. 5
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
publisher's implied obligation from one simply of "good faith" rejection
to an implied obligation to edit,22 nor did it delineate the extent of the
editorial work required.
Dell, following Goldwater, not only reaffirmed the latter decision,
but went even further in defining the editorial duties owed an author by
its publisher.
III. DELL PUBLISHING CO. V. WHEDON
23
A. The Decision in Dell
Dell concerned a contract for publication of a novel by one Julia
Whedon. On the basis of an outline of the novel, the publisher entered
into the contract and paid Whedon an advance. Although the editor had
expressed enthusiasm for the novel, and despite the publisher's having
paid a second advance when the first half of the manuscript was received,
the publisher rejected the work as unsatisfactory in form, content and
style after the entire manuscript's submission. Whedon subsequently
sold the publishing rights to Doubleday & Co., whereupon Dell sued her
for return of its two advances.
In response, Whedon claimed that Dell had breached its publishing
contract by failing to act in good faith in the way it rejected her work.
The court agreed, ruling that Dell had not fulfilled its implied obligations
under the clause allowing the publisher to reject a work for being
unsatisfactory.24
The court, citing Gold, began its analysis by defining "satisfactory to
Dell" as meaning "to Dell's subjective satisfaction. ' 25 Whedon had not
contended, however, that the rejection of her manuscript was for any
reason other than a good faith, honest belief that it was unsatisfactory.
Acknowledging this, the court nevertheless reasoned that a publisher
could not fulfill its obligations simply by rejecting a manuscript in the
good faith belief that it was unsatisfactory. More was required. Thus,
the court held that implicit in every publishing agreement is a "good
faith obligation" on the part of a publisher to provide "at the very least, a
detailed explication of the problems" in the manuscript and "an opportu-
nity to revise it" in order "to bring it up to publishable standards.
' 26
22. The court gave no indication in its decision by which a breach of contract holding was
not based on the already recognized good faith obligations.
23. 577 F. Supp. 1459 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
24. Id. at 1462.
25. Id. (citing Random House, Inc. v. Gold, 464 F. Supp. 1306, 1308-09 (S.D.N.Y.), affd
mer., 607 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1979)).
26. 577 F. Supp. at 1462-63.
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In so holding, the court stated that Whedon, induced to write her
manuscript in reliance on the publisher's approvals and advances, was
owed more than an honest belief that her manuscript was unsatisfactory.
Moreover, the court reasoned that such greater obligation was consistent
with Goldwater's prescription requiring editorial work prior to
rejection.
27
Dell sought to distinguish Goldwater in two ways. First, Dell ar-
gued that, unlike the publisher in Goldwater, its failure was not willful,
and that it had not lacked a bona fide commitment to the contract. The
court found these considerations irrelevant, stating that Goldwater rested
solely on the publisher's failure to provide editorial assistance. The court
also rejected Dell's second argument that Goldwater's book, unlike
Whedon's, was non-fiction, so that editorial assistance in Goldwater was
more appropriate. The court concluded that Dell's second argument was
dismissable where no editorial assistance of any kind had been
provided. 28
Dell further contended that Gold dictated a different result. The
court, likewise, rejected this argument. Acknowledging that there was
language in Gold supporting Dell's position, the court nonetheless stated
that the publisher in Gold had provided the author with criticism and an
opportunity to revise before rejection.29
In its reply brief, Dell made the additional argument that Whedon's
manuscript had not been criticized because it would have been unpub-
lishable even with revisions.30 The court responded to this argument by
stating that "any suggestion" that the manuscript was unsalvageable was
"undercut" by Doubleday's subsequent publication of the manuscript. 3
Finding that Dell had breached its publishing agreement with
Whedon, the court held that Whedon was under no obligation to return
her advances and dismissed Dell's complaint. The court also stated that
Dell's breach discharged Whedon from her grant of exclusive rights to
the publisher, thereby justifying Whedon's subsequent sale of her manu-
script to Doubleday with Dell's release.32
Finally, the court suggested that even if Whedon's contract had still
been in force, that fact would not have been prevented the Doubleday
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1463.
29. Id. at 1463-64.
30. Dell's reply brief stated: "Dell decided that the novel was unpublishable even with
editorial revision, ... it would have served absolutely no purpose to deliver to defendant a
written critique."
31. 577 F. Supp. at 1463.
32. Id. at 1465.
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sale. The court reasoned that the exclusive rights that Whedon had
given Dell became operative only after acceptance of her manuscript, re-
gistration of the manuscript's copyright, and publication within eighteen
months.33
B. Critique of Dell
Dell, on two key issues-good faith rejection of a manuscript as un-
satisfactory and a publisher's exclusive right to publish--departs in sig-
nificant respects from prior case law.
Until Goldwater, an author could successfully contend that a pub-
lisher had breached its implied obligation to act in good faith in rejecting
a manuscript only if the author proved that the publisher had not held an
honest belief that the manuscript was unsatisfactory. 34 Although Gold-
water presented an alternative method for finding a breach of a pub-
lisher's implied good faith obligation, it was obvious in that case that the
publisher had not acted honestly.
The author in Dell did not contend that the publisher's determina-
tion as to the unsatisfactoriness of her manuscript was made in bad faith.
Indeed, she offered no evidence of any bad faith reason for rejection.
Moreover, despite the fact that the author had the burden of proof on the
issue of bad faith, the court, emphasizing Dell's failure to provide a com-
petent representative from its editorial staff to explain the rejection, ap-
peared to shift the burden to the publisher to prove its good faith.
The court seemed to view Dell's failure to provide criticism, the
change in Dell's attitude toward the work, and the absence of a testifying
representative as indications of Dell's "bad faith" in rejecting the manu-
script. Indeed, the court characterized Dell's "sudden turnabout" in
feeling-initially enthusiastic approval of the first half of the manuscript
followed by rejection of the whole-in conjunction with other factors, as
"surely evidence of a lack of good faith."3
This language directly contradicts the court's recognition, impelled
by Whedon's own position, that Dell's rejection was based on an honest
belief that the manuscript was unsatisfactory. 6 Furthermore, whether
or not the publisher honestly believed that the manuscript was unsatis-
33. Id. In its discussion on damages, the court also added, in dictum, that Whedon, "pre-
vented by Dell's nonperformance from fulfilling the complete terms of the agreement, was
entitled to her full expectation interest . . .(i.e., $20,000 upon acceptance of the completed
manuscript)." Id.
34. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
35. 577 F. Supp. at 1464.
36. Id.
1985]
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factory was, pursuant to the court's explicit holding, irrelevant. 37
Although the court specifically held that Dell's good faith was not at
issue, it apparently felt compelled to make it one.
The court's discussion of Dell's so-called "bad faith" suggests that
the court may have been uncertain about its holding. The court's diffi-
dence seems reflected in its incomplete treatment of both Goldwater and
Gold. While citing Goldwater for finding a breach of contract based on
Dell's failure to provide editorial assistance, the court could easily have
decided, based on Harcourt Brace's recognized misconduct in Goldwater,
that such contract breach was there attributable to the publisher's bad
faith. For example, the court in Dell could have relied upon Harcourt
Brace's obvious lack of commitment to the contract and could have cited
the publisher's rejection for reasons other than honest dissatisfaction
with the manuscript.
The only case which Dell cited as precedent for its finding of an
implied obligation to edit was Goldwater. As Goldwater did, indeed, rely
upon violation of such implied obligation in finding a breach of contract,
the Dell court was not incorrect in its citation. The publisher's obvious
bad faith in Goldwater could have been used, however, to distinguish the
case. The disparity between the action of Harcourt Brace and those of
Dell toward their respective authors likely prompted the court in Dell to
search for some element of bad faith on Dell's part.
The manner in which Dell analyzed Gold seems deliberately disin-
genuous. The court in Dell found Gold to be supportive, stating that in
that case the publisher had provided editorial assistance and an opportu-
nity to revise.3" In Gold, however, such assistance and opportunity to
revise were clearly beside the point. There, the publisher was obviously
unconcerned about the merits of the manuscript and was only interested
in the economics of the contract. And so the court in Gold recognized. 39
The dictum in Dell concerning a publisher's exclusive right to pub-
lish is also questionable. The clause granting Dell the exclusive right to
37. Id. at 1462, 1464-65.
38. Id. at 1464.
39. 464 F. Supp. at 1308-09. In reciting the facts, the court stated that Fox, a fiction editor
who "admitted he was not a fan of Gold's work," "criticized the manuscript as shallow and
badly designed." The editor-in-chief of Random House, James Silberman, "sent some of Fox's
comments to Gold. . . . Gold went on to work on a revision of the manuscript." Id. at 1307-
08. Thereafter, the manuscript was rejected as unsatisfactory. "Silberman testified that he
decided to reject the book after reading a second, revised manuscript . . . . He could not
remember exactly why he thought that the work was not a good book, and he did not keep a
written memorandum of his criticisms, but said they were the same as those in the Fox
memo." Id. at 1308.
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publish was applicable "during the full term of the copyright . ...
Commenting upon that clause, the court suggested that Dell's exclusive
right to publish Whedon's manuscript would not "become operative" un-
til acceptance of the manuscript, subsequent registration of the book's
copyright, and publication.4
In making such a suggestion, the court seemed to have relied on an
erroneous view of the copyright law, to the effect that the term of copy-
right begins upon registration and publication. 2 Under present copy-
right law, however, the copyright term begins on completion of a
manuscript.43
The dictum in Dell is suspect for still other reasons. First, the
court's interpretation contradicts the express language of the contract,
which is a present grant of rights. Further, publishing contracts typically
require notice and an opportunity to cure before termination of a pub-
lisher's rights, and some require repayment of advances before such
rights revert.44 The court's construction of the clause above dealing with
a publisher's exclusive right to publish effectively nullifies the express
provisions of notice, cure, and reversion.
C The Impact of Dell
The practical effect of the dictum in Dell is to give a publisher an
exclusive option, not an exclusive right, to publish until publication has
actually occurred.
The implied obligation to edit in good faith that Dell espouses pre-
supposes that the editorial problems a publisher articulates are ones an
author can eliminate through revision. Whether other good faith reasons
for rejection incapable of elimination by revision are still viable and
would excuse performance of the publisher's obligations is unclear.
40. 577 F. Supp. at 1465.
41. Id. Cf. Dodd Mead & Co. v. Lillienthal, 514 F. Supp. 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (after
publication, right to publish does not revert to author on breach of contract but reverts only
after notice and opportunity to cure).
42. Under section 24 of the Copyright Act of 1909, a copyright lasts 28 years from the
date of the first publication of the work.
43. Under the Copyright Act of 1976, applicable to Whedon's manuscript as it was created
but not published prior to January 1, 1978, the term of the copyright is the life of the author
plus 50 years after the author's death. 17 U.S.C. § 303 (1982).
44. See Dannay, A Guide to the Drafting and Negotiating of Book Publication Contracts, 15
BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 295 (1968), reprinted in 64 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, CURRENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 309 (1975); Shapiro, supra note 1, at 164. See also
Gates v. Billboard Publications, Inc., 81 A.D.2d 776, 439 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1981) (a condition of
the relief requested-return of the manuscript to plaintiff author-may be repayment of
advances).
19851
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For example, in Gold, rejection based on economic considerations
was held to be in good faith. Such view has been criticized, however, on
the ground that good faith dissatisfaction should not include dissatisfac-
tion with the bargain.45
It is unclear whether, after Dell, economic considerations will be
deemed good faith reasons for a manuscript's rejection. Dell cited Gold,
but did not reject it. Indeed, Dell found Gold to be supportive. Since no
reasons for rejection of Whedon's manuscript other than merit were cited
by the publisher in Dell, the court did not have to deal with the issue.
Dell clearly limits a publisher's discretion. Required to provide spe-
cific reasons for its dissatisfaction with a manuscript, a publisher cannot
simply claim that a manuscript is unsatisfactory whenever it is unhappy
with a contract. Even good faith dissatisfaction is no longer sufficient.
Instead, the publisher is required to articulate concrete reasons for re-
jecting a manuscript in a manner allowing the author to meet the criti-
cisms. The effect is similar to putting the burden on the publisher to
prove good faith, since the publisher must now reveal its good faith rea-
sons for rejection.
Dell reiterated that the standard for a manuscript's rejection in a
typical author-publisher contract is based on the publisher's subjective
satisfaction.46 If true, review of a publisher's actions should be based on
whether the publisher's judgment on aesthetic worth is honest, not rea-
sonable.47 Nevertheless, the courts in both Goldwater and Dell refused to
accept the publisher's determination of aesthetic worth, i.e., that the
manuscripts were not only unsatisfactory, but unsalvageable. In Goldwa-
ter, the court reviewed the manuscript, found it had merit, and noted its
successful publication by a reputable publisher.48 In Dell, the court re-
jected the publisher's argument that the manuscript would be unaccept-
able with revision by pointing to the manuscript's subsequent publication
by Doubleday. By looking to the satisfaction of Doubleday rather than
of Dell, the court directly contradicted its statement that Dell's subjec-
tive satisfaction was the standard.
45. Healy & Alonso, supra note 8, at 506. The article criticizes the decision in Gold,
which, in the author's view, totally eliminated the good faith requirement. Id. at 508. Bad
faith has been defined as use of discretion for reasons beyond the risk assumed by the other
party. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94
HARV. L. REv. 369, 385-86 (1980). This definition is imperfect, as there is dispute over what
risks are assumed by an author in a publishing contract. For other good faith considerations,
see Healy & Alonso, supra note 8, at 507 n.158.
46. 577 F. Supp. at 1462.
47. Healy & Alonso, supra note 8, at 488-89, 509. See supra note 10 and accompanying
text.
48. 532 F. Supp. at 625.
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The opinion of a second publisher is only relevant if the issue is the
reasonableness of the first publisher's judgment, not the latter's subjective
aesthetic evaluation.4 9 The implicit, but nonetheless controlling, issue in
Dell was whether a reasonable publisher would have been satisfied with
Whedon's manuscript. By looking to Doubleday's acceptance of
Whedon's work, Dell focused upon the publishable quality of the work
and suggested that Doubleday's acceptance was proof of such
publishability.
Thus, Dell, in effect, shifts the dispositive question from aesthetic
satisfaction to "reasonableness," the test being whether a manuscript is
of publishable quality. Instead of "good faith" meaning "honest dissatis-
faction," it now means reasonableness pursuant to a "reasonable pub-
lisher" standard. 50
How Dell, if not reversed or modified on appeal, will be applied in
future cases is uncertain. Nevertheless, certain results are suggested if
subsequent cases follow Dell's logic. To apply a "reasonable publisher"
standard, a second publisher need not have subsequently accepted a re-
jected manuscript. Expert testimony could provide equivalent proof of
such standard.
In cases following Dell, publishers will presumably have fulfilled
their obligations to give comments and opportunities to revise before re-
jecting manuscripts. Invoking a standard of reasonableness in any par-
ticular case, a tribunal could then review the comments to see whether
they "reasonably" permitted the author an opportunity to make the man-
uscript publishable. Moreover, the revisions could be compared to the
criticisms to determine whether the revisions did, or did not, "reason-
ably" satisfy the problems specified. Accordingly, by giving concrete
criticisms, a publisher's judgment is open to review pursuant to a reason-
able person standard.
If subjective satisfaction after Dell still remains the standard for re-
jecting a manuscript, once a publisher has satisfied its obligations to cri-
tique and to give an opportunity to revise, the publisher at that point
should theoretically be able to reject based on good faith dissatisfaction.
This outcome is problematic, however, as the "reasonableness" standard
49. See Healy & Alonso, supra note 8, at 509, stating that on the question of "whether the
publisher found the book aesthetically worthy as a piece of literature, the issue is the honesty,
and not the reasonableness of the publisher's decision; no other publisher's opinion is rele-
vant." See also supra note 10 and accompanying text.
50. If the question is the reasonableness of the publisher's judgment, the test is "whether a
reasonable person in the publisher's position would be satisifed with it," and the opinion of
other publishers or experts would be relevant on this question. Healy & Alonso, supra note 8,
at 509.
1985]
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is arguably applicable at every step. Should a publisher's comments and
an author's revisions be reviewable pursuant to such standard, little, if
anything, remains of subjective satisfaction.51
Given the new regime that Dell proposes, publishers may seek to
limit their liability by refusing to contract based on outlines, as opposed
to full manuscripts, unless the author is well known. There seems to be
no easy alternative, however, to a publisher's doing editorial work and
giving an author a good faith opportunity to revise, once a contract for a
work has been signed.52 Moreover, it is problematic that in the situation
of a manuscript's litigated rejection a publisher will be able to avoid judi-
cial review of its editorial criticisms, an author's revisions, and the final
manuscript's form under a "reasonable publisher" standard."
IV. ZILG V. PRENTICE-HALL, INC 
54
Zilg construed the following clause, standard in most, if not all, pub-
51. See William Morrow & Co. v. Davis, 583 F. Supp. 578 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), a post-Dell
case, in which plaintiff publisher moved for summary judgment on its action against an author
for breach of contract for failure to deliver a manuscript of the author's autobiography "satis-
factory to the publisher in form and content." The court defined the crux of the dispute as
"what written product is a manuscript 'satisfactory to plaintiff in form and content.'" In
denying the publisher's motion, the court reasoned that the meaning of what constituted a
satisfactory autobiography was capable of three reasonable interpretations-those of the pub-
lisher, the subject of the autobiography, and the ghost writer. Id. at 579. The publisher con-
tended that the manuscript submitted did not conform to its earlier editorial comments on a
submitted draft. The ghost writer, on the other hand, contended that the manuscript did
conform and was satisfactory to the publisher, and that the real dispute was the subject's
refusal to authorize the book. Finally, the subject of the autobiography contended that the
publisher brought about the creation and delivery of a manuscript unacceptable to the subject
and, therefore, breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing. These contentions raised genu-
ine issues of material fact, precluding summary judgment for the publisher. Id.
52. Cf Rinzler, How Much Editing? Decision in Dell-Whedon Causes Stir, PUBLISHERS
WEEKLY, Feb. 20, 1984, at 26. Besides paying less money in advances and contracting for
fewer manuscripts on outlines, lawyers for publishers, the author notes, are contemplating the
addition of a contract clause disclaiming the obligation to edit. It seems impossible that use of
this clause would eliminate the implied good faith obligation.
53. In a post-Dell case involving a rejection of a manuscript as unsatisfactory, Random
House, Inc. v. Howar, No. 07252/82 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 14, 1984), a jury awarded Random
House return of the $50,000 advance paid to author Barbara Howar. Random House had
contracted for Howar's novel based on an outline and had paid a $50,000 advance on the
signing of the contract. After signing, one year passed, during which time the publisher ex-
pressed no dissatisfaction with the author's work and offered no editorial commentary. At the
end of the year, the manuscript was rejected as unsatisfactory. Although Howar had argued
that the publisher had breached its obligation to edit and was, therefore, not entitled to a
return of the advances, Justice Greenfield refused to charge the jury that the publisher had
such a duty to edit. The jury decided that Howar must repay the advances which she received.
See William Morrow & Co. v. Davis, 583 F. Supp. 578 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
54. 717 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1911 (1984).
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lishing contracts, dealing with a publisher's obligation to publish and
promote a manuscript after acceptance:
The Publisher shall have the right: (1) to publish the work
in such style as it deems best suited to the sale of the work;...
(3) to determine the method and means of advertising, publiciz-
ing, and selling the work,. . . and all other publishing details,
including the number of copies to be printed . . ..
Prior to Zilg, this clause gave a publisher near-total discretion over
the manner of a work's publication and subsequent promotion. 6 The
only limitation, absent express contractual language, upon the exercise of
a publisher's discretion, was the requirement, imposed by case law, that
such exercise be made in "good faith."' '57 Other cases defined the mean-
ing of "good faith" as the requirement that a publisher expend "reason-
able efforts" in publishing and promoting a work.5
Zilg took the standard of "reasonable efforts" and elevated it one
step further. In Zilg, the Second Circuit not only reaffirmed the implicit
requirement that a publisher act in "good faith" consistent with the ru-
bric of reasonableness, but, like Dell, added specific contours to the defi-
nitions of "good faith" and "reasonableness."
A. The Decision in Zilg
The plaintiff in Zilg, an author, brought suit against his publisher,
Prentice-Hall, for contract breach in failing to promote his book in good
faith. Plaintiff also sued E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. for tortious in-
terference with his contract with Prentice-Hall. Plaintiff charged that
Prentice-Hall had, in bad faith, reduced its printing and promotion of his
book because of duPont's economic coercion aimed at suppressing the
book, a work critical of the duPont family.
Prentice-Hall responded by moving for summary judgment dis-
missing plaintiff's claim.59 It argued that its contract with plaintiff, giv-
55. 717 F.2d at 674.
56. Shapiro, supra note 1, at 164.
57. "Under New York law there is implied in every contract a covenant of fair dealing and
good faith." Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. Famous Music Corp., 557 F.2d 918, 923 n.8 (2d
Cir. 1977) (citing Van Valkenburgh, Nooger & Neville, Inc. v. Hayden Publishing Co., 30
N.Y.2d 34, 45, 281 N.E.2d 142, 144, 330 N.Y.S.2d 329, 333, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 875 (1972)).
The opinion continues "[t]hus, Famous' determination of effectiveness or profitability of pro-
motion would have to be made in good faith."
58. Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. Famous Music Corp., 557 F.2d at 923; Schisgall v.
Fairchild Publications, Inc., 207 Misc. 224, 137 N.Y.S.2d 312 (Sup. Ct. 1955). See also Wood
v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917).
59. Zilg v. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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ing it discretion as to how plaintiffs book was to be promoted, precluded
implication of a "good faith and fair dealing" standard.'
The trial court, by Judge Brient, rejected Prentice-Hall's argument
and denied its motion. In so doing, the court reasoned that every con-
tract, including agreements according publishers almost complete discre-
tion over a book's "publishing details," contains an implied covenant of
"good faith performance and fair dealing."61 Continuing its analysis, the
court equated the standard of "good faith and fair dealing" with a stan-
dard of "reasonable efforts." Thus, the court stated, "the contract gave
Prentice-Hall the right to determine the publishing details, including
how the Book should be promoted. The requirement that defendant ex-
ercise this discretion in good faith could not, of course, obligate it to
expend more than fair and reasonable efforts to promote the author's
Book."62
Finding the question whether a party to a contract has failed to act
in good faith to involve issues of fact not determinable by summary dis-
position, the court rejected Prentice-Hall's motion for expedited
judgment.
Thereafter, a bench trial was held before Judge Brient, who entered
judgment for plaintiff against Prentice-Hall, while denying judgment and
dismissing plaintiff's claim against duPont.63 In his decision respecting
plaintiff's contract claim against Prentice-Hall, Judge Brient inexplicably
altered the "good faith" standard of breach from one of "reasonable ef-
forts," invoked on the prior summary judgment motion, to a "good
faith" standard now defined as "best efforts . . . to promote the Book
fully."
' 4
On the basis of this latter standard, Judge Brient held that Prentice-
Hall had breached plaintiffs contract by limiting its promotional efforts
without any valid business reason. The court awarded plaintiff damages
equal to the money lost in sales that it found would have been generated
but for Prentice-Hall's breach.65
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed as against Prentice-Hall, and
60. Id. at 718.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 719.
63. Zilg v. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 717 F.2d at 673 (unpublished district court opinion is
quoted in Second Circuit decision).
64. Id. at 676. If Judge Brient proposed a basis for this change, the Second Circuit opinion
does not mention it.
65. Id. at 673, 676. See McDowell, Reversal of Ruling Troubles Authors, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 16, 1983, at Cl, col. 3.
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affirmed as against duPont.66 The court rejected Judge Brient's standard
of liability invoked at trial, i.e., "best efforts. . . to promote . . . fully
and fairly." Instead, it reverted to a standard of "reasonable efforts," but
added a measure of specificity previously lacking in the case law. Thus,
the court stated in the following excerpt, quoted at length because of its
significance:
We think the promise to publish must be given some content
and that it implies a good faith effort to promote the book in-
cluding a first printing and advertising budget adequate to give
the book a reasonable chance of achieving market success in
light of the subject matter and likely audience ....
However, the clause empowering the publisher to decide in
its discretion upon the number of volumes printed and the level
of promotional expenditures must also be given some con-
tent. . . .We believe that once .the obligation to undertake rea-
sonable initial promotional activities has been fulfilled, the
contractual language dictates that a business decision by the
publisher to limit the size of a printing or advertising budget is
not subject to second guessing by a trier of fact as to whether it
is sound or valid.
The line we draw reconciles the legitimate conflicting in-
terests of publisher and author as reflected in the contractual
language, for it compels the publisher to make a good faith ef-
fort to promote the book initially whether or not it has had
second thoughts while relying upon the profit motive thereafter
to create the incentive for more elaborate promotional efforts.
Once the initial obligation is fulfilled, all that is required is a
good faith business judgment.67
In reviewing the record on appeal, the court found that plaintiff had
failed to sustain his burden of proof corresponding to the standard of
liability excerpted above. Ruling that plaintiff had not proved that Pren-
tice-Hall's "initial promotional activities" were unreasonable, and there-
fore tantamount to having been rendered in "bad faith," the Second
Circuit held that Prentice-Hall had satisfied its obligation to promote
plaintiff's book in "good faith.",
68
66. 717 F.2d at 676.
67. Id. at 680 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
68. Id. at 681.
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B. The Impact of Zilg
Zilg constitutes an important advance for authors by giving explicit
definition to the requirement implicit in all publishing agreements that a
publisher render "reasonable efforts" in the promotion of an author's
work. After Zilg, a publisher will, at the very least, have to provide suffi-
cient promotional efforts at the stage of a work's first printing consistent
with an advertising budget, based on the work's subject matter and antic-
ipated audience, that is reasonably calculated to give the work a chance
of achieving success. A publisher will be less able to "privish" a work,
i.e., mount a "wholly inadequate merchandising effort," when it wishes
to avoid further financial loss on a work that fails to meet expectations.69
Despite its making explicit the standard of "reasonableness" re-
quired at the initial stage of a work's promotion, Zilg did not eliminate
the continued need during such stage to rely upon some sort of implicit
"reasonableness" standard. For example, the question as to what consti-
tutes an advertising budget adequate to give a book a reasonable chance
of achieving success will still have to be answered pursuant to an implied
"reasonable man" measurement.
Nevertheless, Zilg explicitly defines the parameters of a publisher's
promotional activities against which to apply a "reasonableness" stan-
dard, and that is significant.7°
In holding that a publisher's promotional activities after the first
printing of an author's work must evidence "good faith business judg-
ment,"7 Zilg continues the implicit requirement from prior case law that
such activities during this period be rendered consistent with a "reason-
able efforts" standard. Zilg does not restrict application of the "reason-
able efforts" standard to the initial stages of a work's promotion by
69. Id. at 679.
70. In Fraser v. Doubleday & Co., 587 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), an author's com-
plaint alleged that defendant publisher breached the publishing agreement by not using its best
or reasonable good faith efforts to advertise, promote and exploit the author's work. In deny-
ing the publisher's motion for summary judgment on that issue, the court stated:
Plaintiffs' allegation of inadequate promotion of their book by defendant cannot
be resolved on this motion. There are still substantial controversies as to certain facts
relevant to the test formulated in Zilg v. Prentice-Hall, Inc. . . . for determining if a
publisher has breached its contractual obligation to promote a certain book. These
controversies include issues such as whether the size of the initial printing was suffi-
cient in light of the subject matter and likely audience of the book .. .; whether
defendant had a marketing plan for the book; whether the amount spent on promot-
ing the book was sufficient; and whether the book should have been initially printed
in foreign languages. These issues must be resolved before it can be determined
whether defendant's initial printing and promotional efforts were adequate or
whether later efforts were not undertaken because of a good faith business judgment.
Id. at 1288.
71. 717 F.2d at 680.
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having there given expression to what it leaves silent in subsequent
stages. This follows from prior case law holding that where a contract is
silent respecting a party's duty to promote, which duty must presuppose




The effect of Dell and Zilg is to give authors, by judicial fiat, what
they have generally been unable to obtain by contract negotiation. Previ-
ously, the typical book publishing agreement imposed no obligation on a
publisher to articulate its reasons for rejecting a manuscript as unsatis-
factory, let alone obligate a publisher to inform an author of such reasons
and permit revision of the manuscript to make it publishable.
Moreover, previously, the typical book publishing agreement con-
tained only vague obligations to publish and promote a work, and only
established authors were able to share in a publisher's promotional
decisions.
Dell and Zilg alter these situations by diminishing the exercise of a
publisher's discretion. To what extent, of course, remains for future de-
terminations. Nevertheless, these decisions have a present cumulative ef-
fect, and that is to require that a publisher, once it contracts for a work,
make a definite commitment to the work.73
Dell translates such commitment into providing authors with actual
editorial assistance to enable them to make their manuscripts publisha-
ble. This means the following: criticism and the opportunity to revise;
non-refundability of advances for a publisher's rejection of a manuscript
based on "reasonableness"; and, perhaps, reversion of an author's rights
for a publisher's failure to publish.
Following a manuscript's acceptance for publication, Zilg translates
such commitment into rendering "adequate" promotional efforts aimed
at giving the manuscript, now a book, a reasonable chance to attain mar-
ket success.
72. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917).
73. Dannay, supra note 44, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS at 317.
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